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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON HENRY
MANNE'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
Kenneth Lehnt
INTRODUCTION
Like almost everyone else at the Symposium, Henry Manne's
work has had an enormous influence on my career. My first exposure
to Manne's work was in my second year of graduate school at Wash-
ington University, in an industrial organization course taught by Lee
Benham. I went to graduate school thinking that I wanted to be a
macroeconomist. After a full year of Keynesian style macro, I was
feeling that the emperor had no clothes and wondered what I was go-
ing to do. Then Lee introduced my classmates and me to papers by
Ronald Coase, Armen Alchian, Harold Demsetz, and Henry Manne.
These papers gave us a whole new way of thinking about problems
and convinced me that I wanted to be an economist. In reading
Manne's papers in advance of this conference, it was, as Yogi Berra
would say, "d6j vu all over again"--I experienced the same sense of
insight and excitement that I did in graduate school.
I. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MERGERS AND THE MARKET FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL
I begin by making a few observations on Manne's classic 1965
paper, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control.'
First, it is fascinating to reread this paper today with the hind-
sight of several hundred papers, mostly empirical, that have been
published in the economics literature on the market for corporate
control since 1965. At the time Manne wrote the paper, there was
virtually no literature in economics on the workings of this market.
As evidence, Manne cited only four articles in economics journals,
but fifteen in law journals. His article may hold the all-time Journal
of Political Economy ("JPE") record for the ratio of legal to econom-
t Director, Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh.
1 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110
(1965).
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ics cites. In any event, Manne clearly broke new ground in the eco-
nomics literature with the publication of this paper.
Second, Manne's paper anticipated numerous issues that have
been addressed by financial economists during the past two decades.
Perhaps most prominently, much research in this area has examined
whether the market for corporate control plays the disciplinary role
described in Manne's paper. Although many questions still remain on
this topic, there is plenty of evidence that it does. Targets of hostile
takeovers generally have low market to book ratios and often have
squandered free cash flow on negative NPV projects. Leveraged
buyouts and proxy contests create substantial shareholder value and
result in significant improvements in the operating performance of
target companies.
In addition to this insight, Manne's paper anticipated research on
several other topics related to the market for corporate control. At
the end of his paper, Manne suggests the merit of examining how the
stock prices of target and acquiring firms react to takeover an-
nouncements. In 1974, Gershon Mandelker, my colleague at the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh, published the first paper on this topic.2 Since
then, the analysis of stock returns around mergers has grown into a
cottage industry.
Manne's discussion of the relation between the market for corpo-
rate control and the "alleged separation of ownership and control
' 3
hinted at some substitutability between an active takeover market and
concentrated corporate ownership structures. In a clever study of
state laws governing takeovers of banks, Mary Schranz finds that the
ownership structure of banks becomes more concentrated after re-
strictive takeover laws are passed, suggesting that such substitutabil-
ity does indeed exist.
4
Manne's article also explicitly recognized other topics that have
spawned numerous papers in the financial economics literature. He
discussed how the structure of bids might mitigate the now familiar
"hold-out" problem.5 In a brilliant discussion of how the SEC's
proxy solicitation rules favor insiders, Manne described how outsiders
have to "'guess' why the company is doing as well as it should,
' 6
whereas insiders are fully informed about the firm's performance.
This is an example of a problem that today we would refer to as one
of "asymmetric information," about which much has been written in
2 See Gershon Mandelker, Risk and Return: The Case of Merging Firms, I J. Fin. Econ.
303 (1974).
3 Manne, supra note 1, at 112.
4 See Mary S. Schranz, Takeovers Improve Firm Performance: Evidence from the Bank-
ing Industry, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 299, 320-323 (1993).
5 See Manne, supra note 1, at 116.
6 Id. at n.18.
[Vol. 50:263
CONTRIBUTIONS TO FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
the corporate control literature and more generally in the finance lit-
erature. Manne also discusses how the shareholdings of management
affect their incentives to approve merger proposals, a topic that has
been the focus of much empirical research. Manne also discusses
how "side payments" to management can strengthen their incentives
to approve value-increasing mergers. The modem name for these
side payments is "golden parachutes," and a great deal of research has
been devoted to this topic.
Footnote 10 of Manne's article also contained the essence of the
efficient markets hypothesis, one of the major intellectual break-
throughs in finance during the past thirty years. The note elaborates
on Manne's statement in the text that: "A fundamental premise un-
derlying the market for corporate control is the existence of a high
positive correlation between corporate managerial efficiency and the
market price of shares of that company."7 In the note, Manne ac-
knowledged that "[tlhe contention is often made that stock market
prices are not accurate gauges, since far more trades take place with-
out reliable information than with it."s He goes on to argue that
"there is reason to believe that intelligence rather than ignorance ul-
timately determines the course of individual share prices."9 Although
the theory posited in this footnote is a bit loose, the basic intuition of
market efficiency, which has since been validated, lies in footnote 10
of Manne's paper.
Finally, Manne's paper also anticipated various "real world"
phenomena that became common during the hostile takeover boom of
the 1980s. His argument that "the lower the stock price, relative to
what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive
the take-over becomes to those who believe that they can manage the
company more efficiently" 10 seemed to presage the rash of hostile
takeover bids in the 1980s. This argument became the rallying cry for
those trying to stave off takeover regulations in the 1980s, including
takeover artists such as Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn, and James Gold-
smith.
As Bill Carney points out, Manne effectively described how lev-
eraged buyouts might work," but pointed out that "American com-
mercial banks are generally forbidden to lend money for this pur-
pose., 12 Many argue that these banking restrictions in part created an
incentive for Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham to develop junk
7 Id. at 112.
8 Id. at n.10.
9 Id.
'0 Id. at 113.
"1 See William J. Carey, The Legacy of "The Market of Corporate Control" and the
Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 215,235 (1999).
12 Manne, supra note 1, at 113.
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bond financing for the dozens of leveraged buyouts that occurred in
the 1980s.
II. MANNE'S INFLUENCE ON RESEARCH IN FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
To gauge the impact of Manne's work on research in financial
economics, I examined the number of times his work was cited in
corporate control papers published in the Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics ("JFE') from 1974 (the first year of the JFE) through Febru-
ary 1999. The JFE is the predominant finance journal in which pa-
pers on corporate control have been published during the past 25
years. The attached table contains data showing the results of this
analysis.
13
The data shows that only four corporate control papers were
published in the JFE from 1974 through 1982. In 1983 the JE pub-
lished 16 corporate control papers, including 12 in a special issue
containing proceedings from a symposium on corporate control.
Since 1983, the JE has published 114 papers on corporate control, or
roughly 8 per year.
The table also shows the number of times Manne's work is cited
in these papers. From 1974-1983, Manne's work was cited 19 times
in the 20 corporate control papers published in the JFE, or an average
of 0.95 times per paper. From 1984 to present, Manne's work has
been cited only 17 times in 114 papers, or an average of only 0.15
times per paper. The attached table shows the ratio of cites to Manne
to the number of corporate control papers published in the JFE for
each year, 1974-present. It shows a steady decline in the frequency
with which Manne is cited in the financial economics literature on
corporate control. The obvious question is why?
I offer two explanations for these data. First, Mike Jensen and
Rick Ruback published a survey article in the symposium issue of the
JFE in 1983. In the article, they refer to Manne and state that
"Manne's (1965) seminal article initiated an interest in how the mar-
ket for control influences large corporations ....,,15 Since 1983, Jen-
sen and Ruback's survey article has undoubtedly attracted some cita-
tions that otherwise would have gone to Manne. Second, the ideas
initially espoused by Manne in 1965 are now so commonly accepted
by financial economists that perhaps they do not even find it neces-
sary to cite him. Perhaps this is the ultimate compliment that a
scholar can receive from his profession.
13 See Appendix A.
14 See Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5 (1983).
'- Id. at 7.
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APPENDIX A
Table 1
The number of Journal of Financial Economics ("JFE") papers
on corporate control, number of cites to Manne in these papers,
and the ratio of the number of cites to Manne to the number of
JFE papers on corporate control, 1974-1999.
Number of
Year JFE papers on
corporate
control
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Number of
cites to
Manne
2
01
4
1
0
0
1
0
0
11
0
0
2
0
7
3
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
2
Ratio of number of
cites to Manne to
number of JFE
papers on corporate
control
2
0
4
1
0
0
1
0
0
0.69
0
0
1
0
0.37
0.19
0.1
0
0.17
0
0
0
0.17
0
0.18
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Table 1, cont.
1999 3 0 0
Total 134 36 0.27
1974- 20 19 0.95
1983
1984- 114 17 0.15
1999
